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“We might feel that a complete logical analysis would give the complete grammar of a 
word. But there is no such thing as a completed grammar.” (Emphasis ours).    
 Wittgenstein; AWL (Wittgenstein’s Lectures, Cambridge 1932–3, ed. Alice 
Ambrose); p.21. 
 
 
If you are someone with a little familiarity with Wittgenstein’s philosophy but no more, it might 
well be that you know him best through having heard of some of his famous ‘terms of art’: 
language-games, ‘private language’, family-resemblance concepts - and logical grammar. This 
article concerns the last of these. What does Wittgenstein mean when he talks of the task of the 
philosopher being in some way akin to the task of the grammarian? That is the focal concern of this 
article. We will reach that focus in an ‘indirect’ fashion, via thinking about the influences on 
Wittgenstein’s thought and the context of that thought in the cultural milieu of his time. 
When one delves into Wittgenstein’s biography and development as a thinker, one finds an ongoing 
engagement and dialogue with modernism, including with many of the forefathers and 
contemporary representatives of modernism. When one looks for instance at the significant 
influence of the Marxist economist Sraffa on the development of Wittgenstein’s later thought, or 
(still more obviously) at his interest in Adolf Loos and his own remarkable architectural work in 
Vienna,1 one is left in little doubt that Wittgenstein was a thinker whose thought should be, to a 
significant extent, understood as deeply engaged with modernism—albeit idiosyncratically and 
critically.2  
 
And then there is Freud. For, while it’s true that Wittgenstein writes of Freud that he is emblematic 
of a decline in our culture3 and that psychoanalysis is a “powerful mythology” that is likely to do 
                                                 
1 On which, see for example “Aufbau/Bauhaus: Logical Positivism and Architectural Modernism”, by 
Peter Galison, in Critical Inquiry Vol. 16, No. 4 (Summer, 1990), pp. 709-752.  
For Wittgenstein, the elimination of pointless ornament and a constant striving for an honest, exact (and exacting) 
presentation of matters was a moral imperative - in architecture, in work on the self, and in philosophical writing. As 
one can see if one reads his Culture and Value, he saw all three of these, in fact, as—in their essentials—one. 
2 In this latter connection, see especially the final footnote to this article. 
3 See M. O’C. Drury, “Conversations with Wittgenstein”, in Recollections of Wittgenstein, ed. Rush Rhees, Oxford: 
OUP, 1984; p.112. 
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harm,4 he also called himself nothing less than a disciple of Freud5 and incorporated central 
elements of the therapeutic method into his philosophical practice. 
 
Compare the following two quotes: 
 
“Difficulty of Philosophy not the intellectual difficulty of the sciences, but the difficulty of a 
change of attitude. Resistances of the will must be overcome. // 
What makes a subject difficult to understand — if it is significant, important — is not that 
some special instruction about abstruse things is necessary to understand it. Rather it is the 
contrast between the understanding of the subject and what most people want to see. 
Because of this the very things that are most obvious can become the most difficult to 
understand. What has to be overcome is not difficulty of the intellect but of the will. [Nicht 
eine Schwierigkeit des Verstandes, sondern des Willens ist zu überwinden.] 
(Wittgenstein, “Philosophy” (chapters 86–93 of the so-called Big Typescript), p.  
 161.) 
 
‘The pathogenic idea which has ostensibly been forgotten is always lying ‘‘close at hand’’ 
and can be reached by associations that are easily accessible. It is merely a question of 
getting some obstacle out of the way. This obstacle seems . . . to be the subject’s will’ 
(Freud, ‘Psychotherapy of Hysteria’, Complete Works, vol. 2, p. 271). 
 
 
So how should one understand Wittgenstein’s relationship to that high priest of modernism, 
Sigmund Freud? Did he accept Freud’s reduction of much in human life to sex? No, he thought it a 
crudification, a reductivism -- and at the same time an overcomplication: Wittgenstein remarks 
tellingly that Freud never talks about explicitly sexual dreams, which are as “common as rain”.6 Did 
he accept Freud’s theory of the mind? No; he thought it too a scientistic crudification. Overall, his 
verdict on Freud was harsh: he considered Freud a myth-maker masquerading as a scientist, and he 
thought the myths likely to harm those coming under their power. 
What then did Wittgenstein owe to Freud that justified so strong a term as “disciple”? Why 
did he famously speak (in Philosophical Investigations 133) of his method(s) in philosophy as “so 
to speak” a therapy or therapies? 
                                                 
4 Pp.51-2 of Wittgenstein’s Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious belief (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1966); edited by Cyril Barrett. 
5 See Rhees’s comment, ibid., on p.41. 
6 Ibid., p.47. 
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Basically, because Wittgenstein owed a crucial aspect of his philosophical method to Freud. 
His actual approach to the doing of philosophy. Wittgenstein figured philosophy as akin in its 
practice to psychotherapy, to psychoanalysis. 
Where previous philosophers had mostly engaged in theorising, Wittgenstein sought a kind 
of fluidity—a willingness to go wherever the prose needed, in pursuit of clarity and of the right 
level of depth—in his writing and his thinking and his interaction with others, a fluidity that was 
influenced by the dynamic practice of psychoanalysis. In particular, the idea that the acceptance by 
the ‘analysand’ of the analyst’s interpretations was a criterion for their correctness. There was/is no 
room in Wittgenstein for interpretations or descriptions being imposed onto others.7 
In this way, Wittgenstein made philosophy - its practice (whether on another or on oneself), 
its writing, new. Modern, if you will. And, in his central insistence on writing effectively, on 
seeking “the liberating word”,8 the intervention that could help one to escape the prison of one’s 
dogmatic assumptions or one’s intuitive certainties or one’s theoretical leanings, he achieved a form 
of writing that had no direct precedent.  
Wittgenstein’s explicitly ‘methodological’ remarks show how this Freudian legacy should 
be taken9 and why ‘therapy’ and ‘liberation’ are apt terms via which to characterise Wittgenstein’s 
approach to philosophy. For example, consider: 
“We can only convict another person of a mistake… if he (really) acknowledges this 
expression as the correct expression of his feeling. // For only if he acknowledges it as such, 
is it the correct expression. (Psychoanalysis.)” 10 
 
This is pretty unequivocal. It makes clear that the person in question is the ultimate authority for the 
successful resolution of the problem. Compare this remark with the following: 
It is a long superseded idea . . . that the patient suffers from a sort of 
ignorance, and that if one remove this ignorance by giving him information. . . he is bound to 
recover. The pathological factor is not his ignorance itself, but the root of this ignorance in 
his inner resistances; it was they that first called this ignorance into being, and they still 
                                                 
7 And Wittgenstein thought that Freud himself violated this crucial point, when he (Freud) became scientistic. 
8 See especially p.77 of Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle, for this key phrase. 
9 See on this front the well-known PI passages; passages such as 133 (see in particular Read’s “The real philosophical 
discovery”, Philosophical Investigations 1995); 130-2. See our “Towards a Perspicuous Presentation of ‘Perspicuous 
Presentation’”, Philosophical Investigations 31: 2 (2008), 141-160); 108, 116 & 120. See also the chapters by each of 
the authors of the present chapter, in addition to our co-authored chapter, in Jolley (ed.), Wittgenstein: Key Concepts. 
10 The Big Typescript, 410. For more detail on the parallel with psychoanalysis, see the relevant chapters of Baker’s 
(2004). One might also look at O.K. Bouwsma’s outlining of a person-specific Wittgensteinian therapy, modelled on 
psychoanalysis: see Bouwsma’s (1982), “A Difference Between Wittgenstein and Ryle”, in J.L. Craft and R.E. Hustwit 
(eds.), Towards a New Sensibility (U. Nebraska Press, pp.17-32).) 
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maintain it now. The task of the treatment lies in combating these resistances. (Freud, The 
Complete Psychological Works, vol. 11, p. 225) 11 
 
This, we are suggesting, is the very core of Wittgenstein’s promotion of the therapeutic analogy for 
philosophy. It is what makes Wittgenstein a successor to the Enlightenment project: Freedom is 
something that cannot be given to one. One must attain it for oneself. It is also precisely what makes 
Wittgenstein in this one key regard a true successor to Freud. 
 Consider some further remarks of Wittgenstein’s: 
[W]e do not call a ‘rule of grammar’ a law of nature to which the course of language 
conforms, but a rule which a speaker states as a rule of his language. (VoW pp. 103-105, 
our emphases) 
 
[O]ne can only determine the grammar of a language with the consent of a speaker, 
but not the orbit of the stars with the consent of the stars. The rule for a sign, then, is the 
rule which the speaker commits himself to. // This commitment to a rule is also the end of 
a philosophical investigation. For instance, if one has cleared away the scruples about the 
word ‘is’ by making two or three signs available to a person instead of the one, then 
everything would now depend on his commitment to this rule: ε is not to be replaced by =. 
(VoW p.105)12 
 
Here then is the fullness of the difference between science and philosophy to which, we 
submit, Wittgenstein is committed.  Our claim here draws upon what we have already suggested is 
the radically non-scientistic stance involved in Freud’s vision of psychoanalysis, before Freud 
himself corrupted and sought to effect a kind of re-scientising of psychoanalysis. What is radical is 
the requirement of acknowledgement by the ‘therapee' of the therapist’s interpretations, which is 
considered as a criterion for the truth of those interpretations.  
One way of putting our central point is this: the gulf in purpose and methods between the 
natural sciences and philosophy that Wittgenstein over and again wished his readers and students to 
understand has (nevertheless) not sufficiently been understood. As with so many of the differences 
                                                 
11 Of course, this quotation is as yet not clear on whether the task of combatting resistances can be ‘farmed out’ to the 
analyst… This is why Wittgenstein said (p.42 of Barrett (ed.), Lectures and Conversations…): “Sometimes [Freud] says 
that the right solution, or the right analysis, is the one which satisfies the patient. Sometimes he says that the doctor 
knows what the right solution or analysis of the dream whereas the patient doesn’t”—here, in the latter case, there is a 
danger of analysis becoming a kind of authoritarian cult. 
12 See also, VoW, “On the Character of Disquiet” pp. 69-77; cf. also pp. 233-237, pp. 277-279, and pp. 303-305. See 
also p.55ff. of Baker (2004). 
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that Wittgenstein meant to teach (between finite and infinite, mind and body, etc.), there has been a 
tendency to assimilate the two terms, to make one more akin to the other than they actually are. 
It can be tempting to read Wittgenstein’s appeals to ‘grammar’ as appeals to a set of 
externally-imposed rules that one must robotically follow, and many (perhaps still in thrall to 
traditional modes of philosophizing) succumb to this very temptation. If one does so succumb, 
however, one has ignored Wittgenstein’s explicit cautionary remarks and misunderstood the 
relevant elements of therapeutic practice that Wittgenstein seeks to incorporate into the practice of 
philosophy. ‘Grammar’ marks the locus of the difficult work of aligning oneself with the language 
one inherits but in a way that is always open to disputation, clarification and innovation. Grammar 
is something we create as much as we discover it. Grammar is something we do. 
There is a scientistic desire that leads some13 to see grammar to be independent of consent, 
or to acknowledge the role of consent but then to, in practice, ignore it. Succumbing to this desire 
would lead one to practice a kind of grammatical conventionalism and determinism: where 
grammatical rules are read off a stock of uses and these rules then determine meaning. Understood 
in this way, appeals to grammatical rules become akin to appeals to laws, which exist independently 
of those to whom they apply. The danger in treating grammar as if it were independent of consent 
comes from the extent to which the humanity or indeed ‘autonomy’ of language-users comes to be 
downplayed, ignored or indeed occluded.  
We propose that one resist the temptation to conceptualise ‘grammar’ in such a way that its 
arbiters—people—lose their autonomy. Rather than make a claim—vouchsafe an opinion or 
thesis—that ‘Grammar is autonomous’, and so run the risk of seeing it as a kind of system within 
which individuals are powerless, one might seek a proper acknowledgement of human 
mental/linguistic autonomy and power as urging that one acknowledge the person- and occasion-
sensitive conception of grammar as philosophically crucial and invaluable. 
In fact, when one reads the appeal to grammar in Wittgenstein adequately—as requiring the 
consent of the speaker—then one sees that the project of answering the question as to what meaning 
is cannot be something that Wittgenstein undertook. For what a word means, in a large class of 
cases, comes down to the use to which someone puts it when they use the language (PI 43). The use 
to which they put the word will be such that it can in principle be explained through appeal to 
‘grammatical rules’ and the like. But, again: we recommend caution; it can seem natural to take this 
appeal to use or to rules in the wrong way. To help guard against this, consider the following 
remark of Wittgenstein’s that one might helpfully hear as sounding a cautionary note: 
                                                 
13 Including (we would suggest) even some well-known ‘Wittgensteinians’. We fill out this suggestion, and name 
names, in our forthcoming book, Liberatory philosophy. 
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“What is it that is repulsive in the idea that we study the use of a word, point to 
mistakes in the description of this use and so on? First and foremost one asks oneself: How 
could that be so important to us? It depends on whether what one calls a ‘wrong description’ 
is a description which does not accord with established usage – or one which does not 
accord with the practice of the person giving the description. Only in the second case does 
a philosophical conflict arise.” (RPP I 549; our emphasis). 
 
The descriptions, or uses, or rules—the rules that proffer-forth meaning—are not akin to, 
not shadows cast by, nor are they modelled on, the laws of nature; rather they are the rules which a 
speaker states (or could state, or could assent to) as a rule of his language. (cf. VoW pp. 103-105). 
To emphasise this, to emphasise the practice of language, including its always being open to 
newness, to reconception by the speaker, is to leave behind the idea that the outsider-philosopher 
can usefully come in with a theory, or even a pre-established account, of the grammar of a term and 
trump the language-user(s) in question. It is to begin the novel project of returning philosophical 
authority to the everyday. That is, of equalising the dialectical situation existing between the 
philosopher and her ‘patient’,14 of giving up the pretention to have some superior place in a 
hierarchy of knowledge concerning (say) language use. And, rather, as we might put it, finding 
everyday language to be ‘its own master’, truly to take care of itself – ‘through’ us. Put another 
way, we might suggest that what concerns Wittgenstein is the logical consistency of philosophical 
practice. A philosopher does not need, is not required of necessity, to employ words in accordance 
with conventional usage on pain of lapsing into nonsense, but rather needs in her philosophical 
practice to be logically consistent. Equivocating on ‘process’ when talking of mental processes, or 
finding oneself unwilling to commit to a rule for the use of the term process, in the phrase ‘mental 
process’, is to be, in practice, logically inconsistent.  
Clearly then, this ought not to be mistaken for a relativist thesis about language or meaning. 
Neither is it an intentionalist thesis, which claims meaning to be conveyed exclusively by or 
directly responsive only to the pre-existing intentions of the language user. Rather, this move is a 
radical re-orientation of one’s centre of attention in philosophy, of one’s focus. For what we are 
saying includes that everything that we are saying (if we are in fact saying anything) is only true 
inasmuch as it is ultimately taken to be so by our interlocutor. The philosopher as would-be expert 
must stand aside, and let the enculturated individual who is using the term in question come to 
equilibrium concerning how they are willing to commit to a particular usage. The assistance offered 
                                                 
14 Thus the deepest affinity between Wittgensteinian philosophical therapy on the one hand and psychoanalysis on the 
other is arguably with the later Sandor Ferenczi, more than with Freud. With Ferenczi’s groundbreaking concept of 
‘mutual therapy’ / ‘mutual analysis’. A latter-day inheritor of Ferenczi’s mantle here is the Co-Counselling movement. 
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in this process is akin to midwifery, not expert-instruction nor dictation. This, we propose, is what it 
means to take the radical turn in philosophy’s evolution that Wittgenstein offered. In a way, it 
involves the dissolving15 of philosophy into the ongoing, always ethical practice of everyday 
living.16  
In terms of exegesis, the point (if that is the right word) is about the status of the term 
“grammar” in Wittgenstein’s writings: to what use does Wittgenstein put that term? The point is not 
to advance another account of meaning, or an a-contextual definition of the term “grammar”. 
Rather, the point is that if we are to know what the language-user meant by their words, if we are to 
determine the grammar of their language, we can only do so “with the consent of a speaker. The 
rule for a sign, then, is the rule which the speaker commits himself to” (VoW p.105). We need to 
gain the speaker’s consent regarding the grammar of the language they are using—the rules in 
accordance with which they are using their words.  
We propose that ultimately one must take the language user as final arbiter on the grammar 
of the terms they employ in philosophical discourse principally because this needs to be the case for 
therapy to work. Why? Because: for hitherto-unconscious assumptions or ‘pictures’ of how things 
must be, to be brought to consciousness in such a manner that they lose their power over one, it 
must be the person suffering the ‘mental cramp’ that freely comes to acknowledge the picture. 
(Otherwise, whatever remains repressed—whatever in the resolution of the mental cramp is not 
acknowledged freely—will merely remain, and return...)  Dialogue with that person presupposes 
much mutual understanding and what Wittgenstein calls (cf. PI 240-2) ‘agreement’, and, it 
presupposes also a genuine commitment on the part of that person; but for it to be dialogue, as 
opposed to simply an impositional monologue coming from us, such freedom must be preserved. 
 
A last word.  
We have explicated Wittgenstein on grammar; we have shown how this usually misunderstood term 
in Wittgenstein’s lexicon actually takes one in the opposite direction from theory or from language-
policing, and potentially into a fluid realm of 'experimental' forms of writing, in the service of a 
                                                 
15 Cf. this, from that other prophet of Modernism, Karl Marx: “The philosophers have only to dissolve their language 
into the ordinary language, from which it is abstracted, in order to recognise it as the distorted language of the actual 
world, and to realise that neither thoughts nor language in themselves form a realm of their own, that they are only 
manifestations of actual life.” (Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The German Ideology, in Collected Works, Vol. 5 (New 
York: International Publishers, 1976), p.447). This remark intriguingly anticipates Wittgenstein’s own emphasis on ‘the 
everyday’. See also on this https://libcom.org/library/when-language-goes-holiday-philosophy-anti-philosophy-marx-
wittgenstein  
16 We do not of course mean by this that everyday life always involves ethical as opposed to unethical behaviour. 
Rather, we mean to index what the ethnomethodologists capture (and that was already an insight of Wittgenstein’s in 
TLP): the way in which ordinary life is saturated by ethics. The way that members-of-society’s practices can be seen as 
always having an accountable ethical aspect, even if it is often suppressed or taken for granted. 
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thinking that would liberate. What then of Wittgenstein applied specifically to thinking the writing 
of literary modernism? 
 
Here we find some of the most powerful writings to be those of a Wittgensteinian lettrist: James 
Guetti. It was Guetti’s contention that Wittgenstein did not provide anything so clunky as a literary 
theory. Rather, Wittgenstein provided what might be called a framework, to be judged primarily by 
its utility, for thinking about how literature works, and thus for seeing it (or, better, hearing it) as it 
is. Guetti’s Wittgensteinian presentations of authors such as Hemingway and Faulkner, Hart Crane 
and Wallace Stevens enabled literature to be fully present. Wittgenstein made aspects audible that 
were otherwise liable to be silenced (in part, by the very rush to Theory). Wittgenstein’s work on 
‘seeing-as’ and ‘meaning-blindness’ was a key inspiration for Guetti.17 Uttering a word is like 
striking a note on the keyboard of the imagination18– sometimes. Those occasions are occasions 
when a word is being heard for more than its practical use. Guetti sought to bring out the way in 
which words in literature are typically or even quintessentially words on display. Showing, if you 
will, more than saying. That is indeed where (when) literature, in Guetti’s conception, begins. It is 
most certainly an important moment in literary modernism. 
  
In sum, then: One has to take responsibility for one’s words, and this is another way of putting the 
point about being committed to what one means, quoted from Wittgenstein above. A speaker is 
committed to what her words mean—and only this, and not a philosopher’s pet theory or reading of 
the language, tells us what we need to know about grammar, hereabouts – in ‘our (sense’ of the 
word) “grammar”. Wittgenstein helps us to appreciate the works of the modernist literary masters, 
by helping us to appreciate their sounds of / at least as much as their senses, their form as 
constituting so much of their content. And when we appreciate Wittgenstein himself as a kind of 
post-literary modernist19—as someone who chose carefully the placing of every single word, as 
someone who sought to radically modernise the practice of philosophy by figuring it as a process of 
therapy or liberation by means of the very thing that would enslave thought/us: language—then we 
are in a position to avoid misunderstanding any longer Wittgenstein’s use of the term “grammar”. 
                                                 
17 See especially his “Idling Rules. The Importance of Part II of Philosophical Investigations”, in Philosophical 
Investigations Volume 16, Issue 3, pages 179–197, July 1993. 
18 See PI s.7. 
19 A category that has than nothing to do with ‘post-modernism’. Lest we be misunderstood by our favourable 
references to modernism in this article, we should also note here that there are also key aspects of Wittgenstein’s 
thought which are not only anti-post-modernist, but anti-modernist. See e.g. Read’s 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hEPcQ6sIOTY; Read’s “On philosophy’s (lack of) progress: From Plato to 
Wittgenstein, in Wittgenstein and Plato: Connections, Comparisons and Contrasts; eds. Luigi Perissinotto, Begoña 
Ramón Cámara; Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013; and the close of Cora Diamond’s “Ethics, Imagination and 
the Method of the Tractatus", in The New Wittgenstein (London: Routledge, 2000). 
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Contrary to widespread understanding of his work, grammar is not what one is imprisoned by, for 
Wittgenstein. Grammar is something we—we philosophers, and we ordinary members of society—
do. 
